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Highlights 
1. The aim of this paper is to compare estimates of market risk for Islamic and 
conventional bank over for the period 2000-2013 across pre-financial crisis, during 
financial crisis and post financial crisis periods. To the best of our knowledge this is 
the first attempt to compare and contrast the market risk of Islamic banks with 
conventional banks. 
2. We use estimates of Value-at-Risk (VaR) and Expected Shortfall (ES) which 
incorporates losses beyond VaR as market risk measures for both univariate and 
multivariate portfolios. 
3. Univariate analysis finds no discernible differences between Islamic and conventional 
banks. However, dynamic correlations obtained via a multivariate setting shows Islamic 
banks to be less riskier for both sets of conventional banks; and especially so during the 
recent global financial crisis.  
4. The policy implications are:  (i) that the inclusion of Islamic banks within asset portfolios 
may mitigate potential risk; (ii) that the Basel committee should consider the ES measure 
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of risk for Islamic banks in preference to the current VaR methodology, which over-
estimates the market risk of Islamic banks. 
   
 
Abstract 
 
 
We empirically analyze the market risk profiles of Islamic banks with two sets of conventional 
banks taken from the same geographical locations as Islamic banks and from a random global 
sample respectively for the period 2000-2013. Moreover, we divided our sample period into pre-
financial crisis, during financial and post financial crisis. Estimates of Value-at-Risk (VaR) and 
Expected Shortfall (ES) which incorporates losses beyond VaR are used as market risk measures 
for both univariate and multivariate portfolios. Our key input is the share price by market 
capitalization of publicly traded banks of similar size in Islamic and non-Islamic countries. 
Univariate analysis finds no discernible differences between Islamic and conventional banks. 
However, dynamic correlations obtained via a multivariate setting shows Islamic banks to be less 
riskier for both sets of conventional banks; and especially so during the recent global financial 
crisis. The policy implications are:  (i) that the inclusion of Islamic banks within asset portfolios 
may mitigate potential risk; (ii) that the Basel committee should consider the ES measure of risk 
for Islamic banks in preference to the current VaR methodology, which over-estimates the market 
risk of Islamic banks. 
 
JEL classification: C53, C58, G01, G21 
Keywords: Islamic finance, Value at risk, Expected shortfall, Capital structure 
 
1. Introduction 
By 2015 the Islamic finance industry had reached a gross value of USD 1.88 trillion having 
maintained double-digit growth rates despite sustained low energy prices, geopolitical conflicts 
and economic uncertainty in major economies (IFSB 2016; EY 2016). In practice, Islamic finance 
utilizes its own, unique business model, which arguably has little in common with conventional 
finance.1 Yet still they operate alongside in the majority of countries. As a result of the growth in 
the industry, the number of Islamic Financial Institutions (IFIs) across countries has increased 
with more being listed in stock exchanges globally.  
                                                 
1 For example, Islamic banks use profit-and-loss sharing (PLS) instruments (e.g., Mudarabah) that do not guarantee a 
pre-determined profit to depositors and do not force borrowers to repay a pre-determined amount. Islamic fund 
managers face business type (e.g., pork and alcohol industries are prohibited) and financial constraints (e.g., proportion 
of debt a firm has) when creating or rebalancing their investment portfolios. 
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The empirical work comparing Islamic and conventional finance has typically focused on 
studying issues pertaining to stability. A significant portion of this work is focused on studies 
between Islamic and conventional2 banks with respect to stability (Čihák and Hesse, 2010; Pappas 
et al., 2016; Ashraf et al., 2016a; Ashraf et al., 2016b), efficiency (Johnes et al., 2014; Saeed and 
Izzeldin, 2014), loan default rates (Baele et al., 2014), business model (Beck et al., 2013), credit 
risk (Abedifar et al., 2013) and accounting practices (Elnahass et al., 2014; Abdelsalam et al., 
2016). There is little empirical evidence concerning the market risk profile of Islamic financial 
institutions with regards to their conventional counterparts. The aim of this paper is to compare 
estimates of market risk for the two bank types over different market regimes. 
The Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2007-2010 presents an ideal environment to compare 
the market risk profiles of Islamic and conventional banks. During the GFC, major conventional 
financial institutions either went bust or had to be rescued through multi-billion state-aided rescue 
packages, such as the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) in the US. A major factor in the 
fragility of the conventional financial system is the level of debt as aided by the increasing 
availability of securitization products. Islamic financial institutions are known for their low 
leverage and avoidance of complex financial instruments, such as financial derivatives and debt 
securitization. Such differences have been claimed (see for example, Čihák and Hesse, 2010; 
Pappas et al., 2016) to induce a higher financial stability to Islamic banks relative to their 
conventional peers.  
Market risk is not driven by the fundamentals, as it is derived from share price fluctuations, 
which are formed by interactions amongst different types of agents. Hence, we do not know as at 
prior how the market risk of Islamic banks will fare relative to conventional banks nor how the 
GFC would affect banks’ market risk profiles. On the one hand, these institutions may have 
higher market risk due to (i) lack of experience in managing market risk, (ii) lack of sophisticated 
                                                 
2 We follow Elnahass et al. (2014), Johnes et al. (2014) and use the term “conventional” to refer to commercial banks 
that are not involved in Islamic banking products. 
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market risk management instruments, and (iii) the restricted access to the interbank market for 
liquidity as these markets have interest-bearing elements. On the other hand, they may exhibit 
lower market risk based on their significantly higher equity to debt ratios compared with those 
observed for conventional financial institutions. If this is so, then Islamic financial institutions 
will have competitive advantage in terms of their market risk exposure. Finally, they may be of 
equal risk to the conventional financial institutions, as it has been argued that IFIs are too similar 
to the conventional ones, since the profit sharing ratios and the fee margins charged show very 
high correlations with standard interest rate proxies, such as LIBOR rates (Khan, 2010). 
The closest study to ours is that of Abedifar et al. (2013) that investigates credit risk. As 
credit risk is not readily defined, the authors use three alternative proxies to measure them; hence, 
the interpretation is not always definite. By contrast, with market risk there are precise definitions 
that are accepted by academics, industry-specialist and regulators; therefore, any measurement 
error related to the use of proxies is avoided. 
We contribute to the recent literature in a number of ways. First, we investigate the 
market risk of Islamic and conventional financial institutions over 2000-2013. We use the Value 
at Risk3 (VaR) and the Expected Shortfall (ES) measures in both univariate and multivariate 
settings; thereby incorporating correlation between assets. Market conditions are accounted for by 
three sub-periods namely pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis. Second, we examine the capital 
structure of Islamic and conventional banks and whether any differences manifested therein 
would explain differences in the market risk.  
Our key findings are summarized as follows. Univariately, we find that the market risk 
profile of Islamic banks is no different, on average, than that of conventional banks. This holds 
true across all examined periods/regimes. However, once we allow for dynamic correlation 
between the banks we find that Islamic banks exhibit lower market risk under both the VaR and 
                                                 
3 VaR is used by regulators under Basel II and Basel III to assess the market risk of banks. 
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the ES specifications; a finding more pronounced during the crisis period. Allowing for dynamic 
correlations between the assets brings out the benefit of Islamic investments as they are less 
interconnected to the market (El Alaoui et al., 2015; Visser, 2015).  Our analysis shows that the 
capital structure of Islamic banks is distinctive in that Islamic banks operate with lower leverage 
across the different sub-periods.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a summary of the 
relevant literature. Section 3 presents the methodology followed for the VaR and ES estimations. 
In Section 4, we discuss our data. Results are presented and discussed in Section 5. In Section 6, 
we perform regressions on the capital structure equation across the different sub-periods of 
analysis. The final section concludes. 
 
2. Literature Review 
Comparative studies find that Islamic banks are more efficient and less exposed to credit risk 
than their conventional counterparts (Johnes et al., 2014; Abedifar et al., 2013). Some of these 
qualities of Islamic banks may be attributed to their superior asset quality, as verified through the 
studies of Hasan and Dridi (2010) and Pappas et al. (2016) in terms of financial ratios such as 
Loan Loss reserves/Gross Loans and Impaired Loans. This finding is further reinforced by Baele 
et al. (2014), who track the default rates of 150,000 separate loans from 2006 to 2008. They find 
that the default rate on Islamic loans is less than half the default rate of conventional bank loans. 
Ashraf et al. (2016b) suggests that the adoption of IFSB’s new regulatory measures, specifically 
the net stable funding ratio, will further enhance the financial stability of Islamic banks. Gheeraert 
(2014) approaches Islamic banking from the perspective of its overall impact on banking sector 
development. The author finds empirical evidence suggesting that the introduction of Islamic 
banking spurred the overall development of the banking sector because new Islamic banks 
complement the existing conventional banks. 
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In many countries, Islamic banks co-exist with conventional banks, and there is pressure to 
apply conventional regulations to Islamic banks. Moreover, as stated by Abdullah et al. (2011), 
there is no separate regulatory4 scheme to govern the operations of Islamic banks. It is common 
for Islamic banks to operate under the laws governing conventional banks. This approach has led 
to an interesting dilemma for Islamic banks. On one hand, the adoption of international standards 
is critical because it enhances credibility and fuels the growth of Islamic banks. On the other hand, 
subjecting Islamic banks to the same regulatory framework overlooks the nature and types of 
risks pertaining to these banks. Recent studies have also compared Islamic and conventional 
banks based on their risk profiles while considering them complementary banking systems within 
the overall financial system. 
Within the Islamic banking literature, there are very few empirical studies that have 
specifically focused on risk measurement and quantification in Islamic banks and their 
comparisons with conventional banks. Ashraf et al. (2016a) provides insight into the relationship 
between the ownership structure and financial fragility of banks from the GCC region and find 
banks with higher ownership concentration exhibit higher financial fragility. Abdullah et al. 
(2011) assess key issues in the measurement and monitoring of operational risk in Malaysian 
Islamic banks. Wiyono and Rahmayuni (2012) explore the variables that affect the relationship 
between the levels of risk faced by Islamic banks and their relative profitability. Boumediene 
(2011) explores the credit risk dynamics between Islamic and conventional banks using distance-
to-default and default probabilities and finds that Islamic banks have lower credit risk than 
conventional banks. Wiyono and Rahmayuni (2012) state that, with the exception of Malaysia, 
central banks have no other mechanism for providing liquidity to banks other than through the 
                                                 
4 There are currently two regulatory bodies for Islamic finance, IFSB and AAOIFI.  However, not all Muslim countries 
adhere to the standards of one of these bodies and may be following their central bank. For example AAOIFI 
accounting standards are only mandatory requirements in the jurisdictions of Bahrain, Jordan, Oman, Qatar, Qatar 
Financial Centre, Sudan and Syria. We would like to thank the reviewer for clarifying this matter for us. 
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basis of interest lending, which makes Islamic banks more susceptible to liquidity risk, unlike 
conventional banks, which can tap into a central bank liquidity facility during periods of liquidity 
shortages. The limited number of Shariah-compliant financial instruments is another reason why 
Islamic banks may be at an inherent disadvantage to conventional banks.  
Our study complements these studies by focusing specifically on the market risk of Islamic 
banks. By following the methodology used by regulators under the Basel regimes, we directly 
compare market risk between Islamic and conventional banks. To the best of our knowledge, ours 
is the first study to make such a comparison. 
 
3. Methodology 
 
Our empirical analysis adopts both a univariate and multivariate VaR specifications which 
we detail below. We start by defining and discussing the characteristics of Value at Risk (VaR) 
and the expected shortfall (ES) risk measures. We then discuss, in some depth, the methodology 
used to estimate these two risk measures in a univariate and then in a multivariate setting. Finally 
we propose statistical tests for determining the accuracy of the VaR and ES measures. 
Since its introduction in the 1980s, VaR has been established as a popular measure of market 
risk together with its related extension, the expected shortfall. VaR5 is the single most widely 
accepted measure of market risk among risk practitioners, as it is simple to calculate and benefits 
from a simple, intuitive interpretation.  
To calculate market risk, we follow the risk measure of Dowd et al. (2008) and define ܯఝ as 
follows: 
 ܯఝ ൌ න ߮ሺ݌ሻ
ଵ
଴
ݍ௣݀݌ 
(1)  
                                                 
5 VaR has its detractors.  For example during the LTCM crisis of 1998, VaR’s performance was criticized for its 
failings.  
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where ݍ௣  is the ݌  loss quintile, ߮ሺ݌ሻ  is a weighting function defined over the full range of 
cumulative probabilities ݌ ∈ ሾ0,1ሿ and ܯఝ is the class of quantile-based risk measures. 
 VaR and ES constitute two well-known members of this class. The VaR at confidence 
level ߙ is defined as follows: 
 ܸܴܽ௔ ൌ ݍ௔ (2)  
Furthermore, each individual risk measure is characterised by its individual weighting function 
߮ሺ݌ሻ. The weighting function for VaR is a Dirac delta function that gives the outcome ሺ݌ ൌ ߙሻ 
an infinite weight and zero weight for every other outcome. 
The ES at confidence level ߙ is the average of the worst 1 െ ߙ losses, which is defined as follows: 
 ܧܵ௔ ൌ 11 െ ܽන ݍ௣݀݌
ଵ
௔
 
(3)  
The weighting function for ES gives all tail quantiles the same weight of 1 1 െ ܽ⁄  and the non-
tail quantiles zero weight.  
3.1. Univariate VaR 
For the univariate VaR models, we define an asset’s return process at time t as follows: 
 ܴ௧ ൌ ߪ௧ߝ௧ (4)  
where σ௧ is the conditional volatility, Ψ௧ିଵ represents the information available at time ݐ െ 1 and 
ߝ௧|ߖ௧ିଵ~ܰሺ0,1ሻ. 
The simplest VaR model assumes that the conditional variance follows the industry 
standard RiskMetrics (RM), where the conditional variance is specified by equation (5). 
 ߪ௧ଶ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߣሻߝ௧ିଵଶ ൅ ߣߪ௧ିଵଶ  (5)  
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where ߣ is set to 0.946 for daily data, and the returns are generated from a normal distribution.  
This is our first univariate method. 
An alternative specification of the conditional volatility is the GARCH(1,1) model 
(Bollerslev, 1986), in which the conditional variance evolves as follows: 
ߪ௧ଶ ൌ ߱ ൅ ߙߝ௧ିଵଶ ൅ ߚߪ௧ିଵଶ     (6) 
For the second univariate method we use Monte Carlo simulation to produce a series of 
hypothetical returns based on GARCH(1,1) innovations from day ݐ ൅ 1 to ݐ ൅ ܭ. Based on these 
hypothetical single day returns, we calculate the hypothetical ܭ-day return for each Monte Carlo 
path. However, to generate the random variable in our simulation, we make use of standardized 
residuals based on the asset returns. Combining the two gives the Filtered Historical Simulation 
(FHS), of Barone-Adesi et al. (1999). Collecting the ܰ  hypothetical ܭ -day returns in a set 
൛ ෠ܴ௜,௧ାଵ:௧ା௄ൟ௜ୀଵ
ே
 allows us to calculate the ܭ-day VaR as follows: 
 ܸܴܽ௔ ൌ ݍ௔൛ ෠ܴ௜,௧ାଵ:௧ା௄ൟ௜ୀଵ
ே
 (7) 
 
3.2. Multivariate VaR Models 
The multivariate VaR assumes that a portfolio comprises ߋ  assets. Typically, the 
portfolio variance is defined as follows: 
 ߪ௉,௧ଶ ൌ ܟᇱ܄ܟ with ࢂ௧ ൌ ࡰ௧ᇱࡾ௧ࡰ௧        (8) 
where w is the weights matrix, V is the variance-covariance matrix of the asset returns, ࡰ௧ is a 
matrix of time varying volatility and ࡾ௧  is a matrix of time-varying correlations that may be 
modelled using Engle’s (2002) Dynamic Conditional Correlation (DCC) process, whereby the 
conditional correlation can be denoted as follows: 
                                                 
6 RiskMetrics uses a lambda value of 0.94 for daily data (RiskMetrics, 1996). 
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 ߩ௜௝,௧ ൌ ݍ௜௝,௧ඥݍ௜௜,௧ݍ௝௝,௧ 
(9)   
where ݍ௜௝,௧  is an auxiliary variable that drives the correlation dynamics. For the auxiliary ݍ௜௝,௧ 
variable, we assume an exponential smoothing structure: 
 ݍ௜௝,௧ ൌ ߣݍ௜௝,௧ିଵ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߣሻݖ௜,௧ିଵݖ௝,௧ିଵ (10)
where ߣ may be imposed with typical values in the range ߣ ൌ 0.94	– 	0.98 for daily financial time 
series estimated. 
In our multivariate DCC-VaR7 framework, we employ GARCH(1,1) conditional variance 
modelling. In our setup, we assume that the auxiliary ݍ௜௝,௧ variable is driven by the exponential 
smoothing structure, where λ=0.94.8 In all cases, we have assumed that the portfolio is equally 
weighted. 
3.3. Backtesting VaR Models 
    Based on a time series of past ex-ante VaR forecasts and past ex-post returns, we define the hit 
sequence of VaR exceedances as follows: 
 ܫ௧ାଵ ൌ ቊ1 if ܴ௜,௧ାଵ ൏ െܸܴܽ௧ାଵ
௔
0 if ܴ௜,௧ାଵ ൐ െܸܴܽ௧ାଵ௔  
(11)
Based on equation (11), we construct a sequence ሼܫ௧ାଵሽ௧ୀଵ்  across ܶ days. The forecast of 
VaR exceedance should be 100ߙ% every day. Thus, the hit sequence of exceedance should be 
completely unpredictable and thus distributed independently over time as a Bernoulli variable.  
                                                 
7 In an earlier version of the paper, we also considered a factor model approach to explain the share price returns.  We 
were able to do this, as we were using much larger banks in our global sample and were able to isolate the bank specific 
factors.  In the current version of the paper, all our banks are much smaller, and thus it is likely that all the banks will 
be driven by the same set of factors.  We have therefore not included the factor models approach in this version of the 
paper. 
8 As a robustness check, we try different ߣ values in the ߣ ൌ 0.92	– 	0.98 range; however, the results of this robustness 
check do not challenge our main story.  
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The unconditional coverage test checks whether the percentage of violations is significantly 
different from the corresponding VaR level 1	– 	ߙ. To estimate the required statistics, we follow 
the method of Christoffersen (1998) and Dias (2013) for calculating the likelihood ratio ܮܴ௨௖9. 
The unconditional coverage test confirms whether the number of violations is as expected for 
a given level of ߙ for the VaR. As financial returns exhibit volatility clustering, VaR violations 
are likely to cluster over time. A clustered volatility event arises from events that affect many 
financial institutions simultaneously, which makes it necessary to test the hypothesis of 
independence of VaR violations. Christoffersen (1998) tests for this independence of VaR using 
the likelihood function ܮܴ௜௡ௗ . Finally, Christoffersen (1998) simultaneously tests whether the 
number of violations is correct and whether the VaR violations are independent based on the 
likelihood function ܮܴ௖௖ . 
3.4. Expected Shortfall Estimation 
The ES for a random variable Y at a point of the distribution q is defined as	ܧܵሺݍሻ ≡
ܧሺܻ|ܻ ൏ ݍሻ. We first forecast the condition variance ൫ߪ௧ା௝ଶ ൯ over the period ݐ ൅ ݆	ሺ݆ ൌ 1,2, … , ܭሻ. 
Based on this result, the return ܴ௧ା௝ ൌ ߪ௧ା௝ߝ௧ା௝ is generated, and finally, the returns are averaged 
from the cut-off point to estimate the ES: 
 ܧܵ௧ା௝|௧ሺݍሻ ൌ ܧ൫ܴ௧ା௝|ܴ௧ା௝ ൏ ݍ൯ (12)
To assess the performance of the ES, we split the data sample into an estimation sample 
and a holdout forecast evaluation period. The total sample is denoted as ܶ ൌ 3652, and the first 
ܴ	ሺܴ ൌ 500ሻ observations are used as initial conditions and for initial model estimations. We use 
the last ܲሺܲ ൌ 3152ሻ observations as a holdout evaluation period. Under a rolling forecasting 
scheme, the estimation is always based on a sample of size	ܴ. The first estimation window is ݐ ൌ
                                                 
9 For further details regarding the three likelihood functions, we refer the reader to Christoffersen (1998). 
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1,… , ܴ , and forecasts are generated for 	ݐ ൌ ܴ ൅ 1 . The second estimation window is 	ݐ ൌ
2,…ܴ ൅ 1, and forecasts are generated for	ݐ ൌ ܴ ൅ 2. The last estimation window is	ݐ ൌ ܶ െ
ܴ,… , ܶ െ 1, and forecasts are generated for	ݐ ൌ ܶ.  
Hence, we recursively evaluate 	ܧܵ௧ା௝|௧ሺݍሻ  for one step ahead, and we let q take 
alternative values. Following Zhu and Galbraith (2011), we set the threshold (loss) returns q 
between -0.6% and -1.2% to gauge the sensitivity of the expected shortfall measures for the two 
types of banks. The target is the one-step-ahead expected shortfall; therefore, the predictive 
performance is assessed on an out-of-sample basis. For each date, assuming that the model is 
correctly specified, we expect the average of the observed	ܴ௧ା௝ values 	ܴேାଵ, … , ܴேା௄ less than 
ݍ to be approximately equal to the ܧܵ௧ା௝|௧ሺݍሻ predicted by the model. If	ܧ ௝ܵሺݍሻ is higher than a 
model’s average predictive ES, ܧ ௝ܵெሺݍሻ, then the model tends to overestimate the risk, which is 
measured by mean error (ME), where	ܯܧ௝ሺݍሻ ൌ ܧ ௝ܵெሺݍሻ െ ܧ ௝ܵሺݍሻ. Thus, a negative value is an 
indicator of overestimation of risk. An alternative metric that we implement in this study to 
measure predictive out-of-sample performance is the mean absolute error (MAE), given as: 
 
ܯܣܧ௝ሺݍሻ ൌ 1∑ 1൛ܴ௧ା௝ ൏ ݍൟ்௝௧ୀே
෍หܧܵ௧ା௝ሺݍሻ െ ܧ ௝ܵሺݍሻห
்ି௝
௧ୀே
 
(13)
 
4. Data 
The 14-year period from January 3, 2000, to December 31, 2013 (whole period), is split into 
three sub-periods10 around the Global Financial Crisis. The pre-crisis period starts on January 3, 
2000, and ends on June 30, 2007. The period covering the financial crisis, starts on July 1, 2007, 
                                                 
10 The period cut-off is arbitrary and follows the cut-off considered in the majority of studies, including the study by 
Breitenfellner and Wagner (2012), who take the Lehman bankruptcy as the start of the global financial crisis. We start 
our analysis period in January 2000 and conclude it in December 2013 to ensure a sufficiently long yet relevant period 
of analysis based on data availability. 
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and concluded on June 30, 2009. Finally, the post-crisis period starts on July 1, 2009, and 
concludes on December 31, 2013. The period splits are in line with those considered in other 
studies, including Breitenfellner and Wagner (2012). 
Our portfolio of Islamic banks includes 6511 banks with daily share price information on 
Bloomberg over the period under study.  
For the conventional banks we construct two separate portfolios. The first, which we call 
CBI (Conventional Banks in Islamic countries), contains 65 conventional banks of similar 
market capitalization to the Islamic banks and from the same countries where the Islamic banks 
are based. The second, which we call CBO (Conventional Banks in Other countries), contains 65 
conventional banks of similar market capitalization to the Islamic banks but taken randomly 
from a global sample of banks and which strictly excludes banks which are in the CBI portfolio. 
Table 1 shows a breakdown of the sample by country and average market capitalization. 
 
[Table 1 around here] 
 
Table 2 provides summary statistics of the daily stock returns for the banks across the whole 
period and for each of the three sub-periods. Returns for both bank types exhibit the common 
stylised facts of skewness and excess kurtosis. For both bank types, returns exhibit 
autocorrelation, particularly in the non-crisis periods. The average daily return decreases across 
all conventional and Islamic bank samples from the pre-crisis to the crisis period and increases 
from the crisis to the post-crisis period. All bank stock returns exhibit asymmetry across the 
whole period and the sub-periods. During the crisis period, skewness is negative across all three 
samples, indicating that, as expected, during times of financial turbulence, upon the recovery of 
                                                 
11 Initially we had a sample of 85 Islamic banks.  However, we were only able to obtain 65 conventional banks in these 
same Islamic countries and as such we reduced our sample to 65 Islamic and conventional banks. 
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the stock market, share prices do not recover their original value. We observe excess kurtosis 
across all three samples and over the whole period and the three sub-periods. During the crisis 
period, we observe that the kurtosis of Islamic banks is greater than that of conventional banks, 
indicating that Islamic bank share prices reacted adversely if not more so during the financial 
crisis compared with conventional bank share prices. Based on these results, we conclude that 
returns are not normally distributed for conventional or Islamic banks. Thus, in summary, we 
find that conventional bank returns are as expected based on previous studies. However, more 
interestingly, we also find that the returns of the Islamic banks do not show any apparent 
difference from those of conventional banks, which to a certain extent suggests that the market 
risk of conventional and Islamic banks would behave in a similar manner. 
 
[Table 2 around here] 
 
For the capital structure model the explanatory variables are the market-to-book ratio (MTB), 
measured as the relative value of the company compared with its market value; Profitability 
(Profit), measured as the pre-tax income; Ln(Size), measured as the natural logarithm of total 
assets; collateral lagged by one year (Collateral), measured as the portion of cash; marketable 
securities and short-term investments pledged as collateral for short-term and long-term 
borrowing; a dummy variable that is coded as 1 for quarters when dividends were paid 
(Dividends); and Ln(Risk), which is measured as the natural logarithm of (the annualised 
standard deviation of daily stock price returns × (market value of equity / market value of the 
bank)) for each bank i and quarter t. The dependent variable leverage (L) is defined as one minus 
the equity over assets in market value and as such includes both debt and non-debt liabilities, 
including deposits. Unlike debt, leverage has the advantage of being well defined. In addition, 
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leverage increases the sensitivity of equity to bank performance. The explanatory variables are 
calculated following the definitions provided by Gropp and Heider (2010). 
 
[Table 3 around here] 
 
5. Market risk estimates 
In this section, we present the results of the VaR and ES risk measure estimates. We first assume 
that there is no covariance structure between the individual banks in each of our three portfolios.  
Given this we only need to consider the diagonal elements of the variance-covariance matrix. The 
implication is that we can aggregate the VaR and ES market risk measures. We refer to this 
method as the univariate approach. 
Note that assuming zero correlation is a strong assumption, especially as correlation increases 
during times of financial turbulence. Therefore, we relax the assumption of zero covariance, 
which leads to the multivariate case in which the VaR and ES risk measures can no longer be 
summed. 
   
5.1. Univariate VaR and ES 
 Based on the time series of the daily returns for conventional and Islamic banks, we 
estimate one-day-ahead VaR estimates using a rolling window of 500 days. The Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision (1996) has set a level of 99% VaR over a one-day period. If this VaR is 
an accurate representation, only 1% of the returns should produce VaR violations. This approach 
is based on equation (11), and we expect to observe one exceedance every 100 days. 
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 In Table 4 12 , we present the average VaR estimated using the industry standard 
RiskMetrics (RM) and the simulation based Filtered Historical Simulation approach (FHS) Panel 
A for three separate portfolios. “IB” comprises the average VaR for Islamic banks, “CBI” 
comprises the average VaR of conventional banks in Islamic countries and “CBO” comprises the 
average VaR of conventional banks in other countries. The pCBI and pCBO are p-values based on 
the t-tests between the Islamic banks and conventional banks in Islamic countries and Islamic 
banks and conventional banks in other countries respectively. 
 
[Table 4 around here] 
 
 Panel A shows that for the whole period there is no significant difference in the average 
VaR between Islamic and conventional banks. A plausible reason for this may be that investors 
perceive shares of Islamic and conventional financial institutions as complementary to each other.  
Moreover, this applies equally to all of the three individual sub-periods. In summary regardless of 
the period and the method, the differences in VaR between Islamic and conventional banks, 
irrespective of where they are based is not significant. However, this VaR figure is an average 
snapshot and is obtained at a single-quantile level. To explore these issues further, we perform 
back testing.  
In Panel B, we present the percentage of violations, ܮܴ௨௖ , ܮܴ௜௡ௗ  and ܮܴ௖௖ , and the 
statistical significance from the unconditional coverage test, the independence test and the 
combined coverage test, respectively. Additionally, we report the percentage of VaR violations 
for RM and FHS and for all three portfolios. We find that regardless of the methodology 
employed, both conventional and Islamic banks’ violation are greater than 1% indicating that 
                                                 
12We also implement the non-parametric historical simulation and bootstrapped historical simulation. As the results 
were the same, we have not included them in this paper, but they are available on request from the authors. 
17 
 
 
VaR is inadequate at the portfolio level. Moving from the pre-crisis to the crisis period, the 
number of violations for Islamic banks decreases, but increases for conventional banks. This 
result is observed regardless of whether they are from Islamic countries or from the random 
sample of global banks. A similar trend is observed during the post-crisis period. 
In Table 5, Panel A, we present the ES results estimated based on the RM and FHS 
methods for the whole period and the three sub-periods. We note that the ES is the average of all 
losses after the 1% level, whereas VaR is simply the loss at 1% level. Our findings are consistent 
with that of Table 4. We find that regardless of the period, methodology, and the portfolio of 
conventional banks used, differences between ES of Islamic banks and conventional banks are 
not significant. 
[Table 5 about here] 
 
 Panel B reports the MAE for the expected shortfall measures based on the RM and FHS 
methods. Across the models, a lower mean absolute error (MAE) indicates a better model, 
whereas across bank types, a lower MAE indicates that the risk is more predictable in the 
respective banking system. Based on the RM and FHS method, the main inference from Panel B 
indicates that the MAE is lower for Islamic banks than either of the two conventional bank 
portfolios. An exception is during the post-crisis period where MAE is higher for Islamic banks 
than for conventional banks. During the crisis period, the MAE for the Islamic banks increases in 
the same way as that of conventional banks. This result signifies that during the crisis period, the 
ES measure shows that risk exhibits lower forecastability for both the conventional and Islamic 
banks.  
The inference drawn from VaR estimation suggests that Islamic banks have similar market 
risk profiles to conventional banks for the whole period. However, the finding that during the 
crisis period, the number of VaR violations increases for both Islamic and conventional banks 
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indicates that at times of severe market stress, Islamic and conventional banks behave in the same 
way. The results of the expected shortfall analysis suggest that there are no differences in the 
market risk profiles of the two bank types. Hence, the two methods lead to the same conclusions. 
The focus of VaR is on the cut-off point, which means that under stable market conditions, 
Islamic banks are less risky than conventional banks. The expected shortfall focuses on the left-
most tail of the return distribution and we conclude that during a financial crisis, there is no 
difference between two types of banks with regard to market risk.13 In our analysis thus far, we 
have assumed zero correlation, between the banks in our portfolio. We now proceed to relax this 
assumption. 
5.2. Multivariate VaR and ES 
 Thus far, we have examined VaR and ES from a univariate angle, assuming that no 
covariance exists between the assets; we were thus able to aggregate the VaR and ES across all 
the banks. We now drop this assumption. As a first step, we model the covariance between assets 
using dynamic conditional correlation (DCC) of Engle (2002), where the covariances are updated 
on a daily basis. This daily updated variance-covariance matrix is then used to calculate the daily 
portfolio standard deviation. Furthermore, to calculate the daily VaR we use the Cornish-Fisher 
approximation14. This approximation has the advantages that it allows for skewness and excess 
kurtosis and it provides an approximation to the VaR from a wide range of conditionally non-
normal distributions. The estimated VaR can then be used as the cut-off point to calculate ES. 
 
                                                 
13 To take into account that Basel II was mandatorily adopted by Islamic banks from 2007 onwards, we re-estimate 
VaR and ES calculations for two separate periods between 2000-2006 and 2007-2013. We found no change in our 
results. This result is expected, as the announcement would have been made well in advance of the date when it became 
mandatory for Islamic banks to adopt Basel II and this information would have slowly diffused into the traded share 
prices. 
14 The Cornish-Fisher approximation is given as:  
ܥܨ௣ି ଵ ൌ ߔ௣ି ଵ ൅ ߞଵ6 ቂ൫ߔ௣ି
ଵ൯ଶ െ 1ቃ ൅ ߞଶ6 ቂ൫ߔ௣ି
ଵ൯ଷ െ 3ߔ௣ି ଵቃ െ ߞଵ
ଶ
36 ቂ2൫ߔ௣ି
ଵ൯ଷ െ 5ߔ௣ି ଵቃ 
where ߞଵ and ߞଶ are the skewness and excess kurtosis of the standardised returns and Φ௣ିଵ denotes the inverse of the 
density function at the ݌ confidence level. 
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 ܸܴܽ௧ାଵ௣ ൌ െߪ௉ி,௧ାଵܥܨ௣ି ଵ  (14)
where ߪ௉ி,௧ାଵ is the estimated standard deviation on day t + 1 and ܥܨ௣ି ଵ is the Cornish-Fisher 
approximation. 
 With respect to VaR measure of market risk, we find that the differences between the 
VaRs of the portfolio of Islamic banks and each of those pertaining to the two portfolios of 
conventional banks are not significant. However, significant differences manifest themselves 
better at the sub-samples level. Most importantly, in the crisis period, the VaR for the Islamic 
banks is significantly lower than both CBIs and CBOs. This would indicate that at times of severe 
market stress, Islamic banks are seen as a safe haven, because of their lower debt and higher 
liquidity. In the pre and post-crisis sub-periods there are also significant differences between the 
Islamic banks and the CBOs only. This could be due to the fact that during normal times, Islamic 
banks are potentially seen as less developed, and hence more risky, than similar sized 
conventional banks in developed countries. These results are presented in Panel A of Table 6. 
 Panel B of Table 6 shows that irrespective of the period, the ES of the portfolio of Islamic 
banks is always significantly lower than either of the two portfolios of conventional banks. In 
particular, during the crisis the ES of conventional banks in Islamic countries (CBI) was twice 
that of Islamic banks and the ES of conventional banks in other countries (CBO) was 50% more 
than that of Islamic banks. 
 
[Table 6 about here] 
 
Our results confirm the findings from Panel A, that Islamic banks are less risky than 
conventional banks during the financial crisis. However, the ES is a more encompassing measure 
of risk than the VaR as it incorporates losses beyond the cut-off point. More importantly the ES 
measure demonstrates convincingly that irrespective of the source of conventional bank portfolio, 
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Islamic banks are significantly less risker than conventional banks for the whole period. This 
casts doubt on the current use of VaR to estimate the risk of Islamic banks and hence its 
inadequacy. Thus our findings are consistent with theory that Islamic banks are less risky than 
conventional banks. This may be in part attributed to their stronger financial profile coupled with 
an abstinence from risk as entailed from their higher liquidity and capitalisation ratios. In 
summary, our findings corroborate the theory that Islamic finance investments are less risky, 
findings which has been verified for Islamic banks (Čihák and Hesse, 2010; Pappas et al., 2016) 
and using Islamic equity indices (Alexakis et al., 2016; El Alaoui et al., 2015 and El Khamlichi et 
al., 2014). 
 In sum, the multivariate approach demonstrates convincingly that once correlations 
among assets are taken into account, the portfolio of Islamic banks exhibits lower market risk 
than similar-sized conventional banks. Furthermore, our findings suggest that regulators should 
not solely rely on VaR as measure of market risk for Islamic banks, but place proper attention to 
the ES too.  In Figure 1 we graphically summarize our main findings. 
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
6. Capital Structure 
In the previous section we concluded that, on average, the market risk profiles of Islamic 
and conventional banks are distinguishable, however when non-zero correlations between assets 
are allowed for, differences emerge. A plausible reason for the observed differences in market 
risk may be linked to the business model that Islamic banks utilise. This unique business model 
includes not only financial products that are structured on an equity share premise but also 
limitations for the leverage (i.e., debt) levels of an Islamic bank and its investments.  
Below we examine whether the business model of Islamic banks may be, in part, 
responsible for their lower market risk. We use a standard capital structure model, following 
21 
 
 
Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Gropp and Heider (2010), which posits that the capital structure 
(i.e., leverage) of banks may be explained by a limited set of variables, such as bank size, 
collateral, profits, market-to-book ratio, dividends and risk. The negative relationship between 
leverage and risk is of particular importance, as it implies that riskier banks would want to 
increase their equity buffers.15 
Following Gropp and Heider16 , 17  (2010), we consider the following standard capital 
structure panel data fixed effect regression 
 
ܮ௜௧ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܯܶܤ௜௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଶܲݎ݋݂݅ݐ௜௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଷܮ݊ሺܵ݅ݖ݁௜௧ିଵሻ ൅
ߚସܥ݋݈݈ܽݐ݁ݎ݈ܽ௜௧ିଵ ൅ ߚହܦ݅ݒ݅݀݁݊݀ݏ௜௧ିଵ ൅ ߚ଺ܮ݊ሺܴ݅ݏ݇௜௧ିଵሻ ൅ ߚ଻ܫܤ ൈ ܯܶܤ௜௧ିଵ ൅ ߚ଼ܫܤ ൈ
ܲݎ݋݂݅ݐ௜௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଽܫܤ ൈ ܮ݊ሺܵ݅ݖ݁௜௧ିଵሻ ൅ ߚଵ଴ܫܤ ൈ ܥ݋݈݈ܽݐ݁ݎ݈ܽ௜௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଵଵܫܤ ൈ
ܦ݅ݒ݅݀݁݊݀ݏ௜௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଵଶܫܤ ൈ ܮ݊ሺܴ݅ݏ݇௜௧ିଵሻ ൅ ߚଵଷܫܤ ൅ ߤ௜௧     
  (15)  
 
where IB takes the value 1 for Islamic banks and the other variables are explained in Section 4. 
The IB variable and its interaction terms allow for Islamic banks to have unique intercept and 
slope coefficients.  
[Table 7 about here] 
 
                                                 
15 Modified versions of the Basel accord (for example, by the US regulator) grant regulators the discretional ability to 
ask risky banks for higher capitalisation. However, our wording here implies that banks withholding more equity to 
account for their increased risk do so at their own discretion, which is in line with key studies (Calomiris and Wilson, 
2004; Flannery and Rangan, 2008) that fail to find a connection between regulatory pressure and the leverage/risk 
relationship. 
16 Other researchers use the same specification to tackle endogeneity. For example, Rajan and Zingales (1995) on page 
1452 write, “we lag the explanatory variables one period to reduce the problem of endogeneity”.   
17 As an additional robustness test to control for possible endogeneity, we use the two-step system GMM approach 
proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998), which is used in the banking context in Mollah 
and Zaman (2015), among others. System GMM allows for the use of orthogonal transformations of the past values of 
the endogenous (or potentially endogenous) variables as instruments. The first difference of the variables is used in a 
matching equation with lagged values entering the right-hand side, and GMM is used in the estimation. The technique 
further eliminates unobserved heterogeneity and omitted variable bias. This approach allows us to treat all variables as 
potentially endogenous.  We find insignificant second-order autocorrelation - AR(2) and the Hansen J-statistics of 
instrument validity show that the GMM is a valid representation. Overall, and as expected, the system GMM results 
corroborate our findings based on panel regression techniques. Results based on GMM are available from the authors 
upon request. 
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Table 7 reports the results of the capital structure regression estimation for the whole, 
pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis periods. Besides the usual statistical significance tests, we report, 
in the ߂ሺܫܤ െ ܥܤሻ  columns, the results of statistical significance of the difference in the 
coefficients of the conventional and the Islamic banks.  
Our results show that the capital structure of Islamic banks is markedly different to that 
of conventional banks. Most importantly, the statistical significance of the IB dummy shows that 
these banks operate with lower leverage under all examined periods, ceteris paribus. Hence, 
Islamic banks’ lower leverage could potentially explain the lower market risk, as verified by our 
earlier results. 
Furthermore, the sensitivities of Islamic and conventional financial institutions to key 
explanatory variables proposed by the capital structure model are significantly different in the 
majority of occasions. 18 Hence, the capital structure model that has been designed for 
conventional financial institutions may not be fully applicable to IFIs. In summary, our results do 
not support the studies of Khan (2010) and Chong and Liu (2009), based on which IFIs should 
have similar risk and capital structure to conventional financial institutions. In contrast, our 
findings suggest that IFIs are substantially different from conventional financial institutions.  
 
7. Conclusion  
The growing importance of Islamic banking has resulted in an ever-increasing literature that 
compares Islamic to conventional banking from a variety of perspectives. To date, no study has 
compared the market risk, as measured by VaR and ES, of Islamic and conventional banks. Ours 
is the first study to do so over an extensive period including the financial crisis of 2007. Our 
study complements other researchers such as those of Abedifar et al. (2013), Beck et al. (2013) 
                                                 
18 An implicit assumption here is that since the capital structure model is tailored for conventional banks, it can only 
pick up differences with respect to those variables contained in it. However, a capital structure model for Islamic banks 
could potentially include variables more attuned to their unique business model. We leave this question open for future 
research. 
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and Pappas et al. (2016) in examining risks associated with Islamic banking and provide 
evidence of the stability of Islamic banking as an alternative to conventional banking. 
Using daily returns of both Islamic and conventional banks over the 2000-2013 period, we 
calculate the market risk as defined by VaR and ES. These measures of market risk are used by 
regulators and are intuitively simple to understand and are estimated based on daily stock price 
data. In contrast to studies that focus on similar risk measures (e.g., Abedifar et al., 2013 for 
credit risk), this study shows that market risk is not dependent on accounting data, which may be 
available only quarterly, and is precisely defined based on a single interpretation. 
In aggregating our risk measures, we find that the univariate VaRs and ESs of both Islamic 
and conventional banks are indistinguishable from each other for the whole period, irrespective of 
the methodology used for calculation and portfolio of conventional banks used for comparison. 
However, the number of exceedances of both Islamic and conventional banks increases during the 
crisis period, indicating that market stress affects conventional and Islamic banks equally. Using 
the multivariate approach incorporating dynamic conditional correlation, we find that the VaR of 
Islamic banks is significantly lower than that of portfolio of conventional banks during the 
financial crisis. Furthermore this finding is robust to different portfolio of conventional banks.  
More importantly we find that based on the ES measure of market risk Islamic banks are less 
risky than conventional banks. This finding is robust to time period and the portfolio of 
conventional banks used for comparison. We conclude that at times of financial crisis Islamic 
banks are less risky than conventional banks. 
  One of the key differences observed between Islamic banks and conventional banks is the 
supposedly fundamental difference in their capital structure, which prohibits the use of debt 
instruments for Islamic banks. We test this proposition using a series of panel data regressions on 
the capital structure equation over the whole period and the sub-periods of analysis. We find that 
the capital structure of Islamic banks is significantly different from that of conventional banks.  
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Crucially we show that Islamic banks operate with lower leverage for the whole period and the 
sub-periods. This is consistent with existing theory of Islamic banks and is in contrast to the 
claims of Khan (2010) and Chong and Liu (2009). 
Our study has a number of implications. First, portfolio managers should incorporate Islamic 
banks into their portfolios as a way of reducing risk, particularly so during a financial crisis.  
Second, based on the market risk as measured by VaR, Islamic banks should be treated 
differently from conventional banks and that ES measure of market risk should be used for 
Islamic banks. Third, existing capital structure models for conventional banks is inadequate for 
Islamic banks and researchers should develop new capital structure models that explicitly 
incorporates low level of debt of Islamic banks. 
1 Acknowledgements: We would like to thank the participants of the 4th Islamic Banking and Finance Conference, 2014, 
organized by the El Shaarani Centre for Ethical Finance, Durham University and Lancaster University, University of 
Nottingham Malaysia Seminar Series and University of Bath Seminar Series, anonymous reviewers and the editor. 
Vasileios Pappas would like to acknowledge support from the Gulf One Lancaster Centre for Economic Research 
(GOLCER). 
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Figure 1. Value at Risk (VaR) and Expected Shortfall (ES) estimates. 
Panel A: Whole period Panel B: Pre-crisis period 
Panel C: Crisis period Panel D: Post-crisis period 
Notes: DCC denotes the Dynamic Conditional Correlation (multivariate) estimation model. RM and FHS denote the RiskMetrics and Filtered Historical Simulation (univariate) estimation models. IB 
denotes Islamic banks, CBI denotes Conventional banks in Islamic countries, CBO denotes Conventional banks in Other countries. Whole period covers January 3, 2000, to December 31, 2013; Pre-
crisis period covers January 3, 2000, to June 30, 2007; Crisis period covers July 1, 2007, to June 30, 2009; and Post-crisis period covers July 1, 2009, to December 31, 2013. 
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Table 1. Sample breakdown by country and bank type 
Islamic banks Conventional banks (CBI) Conventional banks (CBO) 
Country Banks % Market Cap Banks % Market Cap Banks % Market Cap
Bahrain 6 9.23 104.66 6 9.23 100.54 
Bangladesh 7 10.77 82.46 7 10.77 72.78 2 3.077 109.09
China 2 3.08 630.97 2 3.08 627.51 2 3.077 566.6
Egypt 3 4.62 92.07 3 4.62 90.76 
Indonesia 7 10.77 1181.37 7 10.77 929.94 
Jordan 2 3.08 82.3 2 3.08 69.7 
Kuwait 6 9.23 1452.77 6 9.23 462.7 
Malaysia 1 1.54 307 1 1.54 316.74 1 1.538 1605.21
Oman 5 7.69 277.31 5 7.69 133.4 
Pakistan 3 4.62 34.37 3 4.62 32.66 1 1.538 675.67
Palestine 2 3.08 14.38 2 3.08 13.7 
Qatar 3 4.62 1264.16 3 4.62 1554.37 
Saudi Arabia 4 6.15 2773.65 4 6.15 2195.78 
South Africa 1 1.54 3170.68 1 1.54 2526.93 
Sri Lanka 1 1.54 31.62 1 1.54 33.46 2 3.077 135.55
Taiwan 2 3.08 2170.59 2 3.08 2474.41 
Turkey 1 1.54 348.57 1 1.54 262.37 
UAE 9 13.85 855.7 9 13.85 841.38 
US     24 36.923 194.25
Other             33 50.769 1013.76
Total 65 100 803.07 65 100 645.61 65 100 803.36
Notes: Market Capitalization is measured in millions of USD in 2000. CBI denotes Conventional banks in Islamic countries. CBO 
denotes Conventional banks in Other countries. 
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Table 2. Summary statistics for all banks, conventional banks and Islamic banks 
 Mean Std dev. Skewness Excess Kurtosis Q(10) 
Panel A: Islamic banks (IB) 
Whole 0.1024 0.0254 0.8912 3.6713 357.8050*** 
Pre-crisis 0.0746 0.0167 1.0602 4.1610 198.8943*** 
Crisis -0.2088 0.0273 -0.1110 4.9118 38.1668*** 
Post-crisis 0.0723 0.0256 0.3541 2.9463 108.9015*** 
Panel B: Conventional Banks in Islamic countries (CBI) 
Whole 0.1119 0.0276 1.2435 9.6005 352.2853*** 
Pre-crisis 0.0891 0.0145 1.1881 5.1355 198.6164*** 
Crisis -0.2021 0.0163 -0.0223 2.6175 36.5391*** 
Post-crisis 0.0879 0.0325 0.7385 5.0361 107.3705*** 
Panel C: Conventional Banks in Other countries (CBO) 
Whole 0.0551 0.0424 0.5314 3.2023 356.6432*** 
Pre-crisis 0.0507 0.0305 0.7254 3.8323 197.8663*** 
Crisis 0.0465 0.0124 -0.1025 2.4662 35.5208*** 
Post-crisis 0.0557 0.0200 0.1528 3.7185 104.8548*** 
Notes: Summary statistics of daily returns for Islamic banks (Panel A), Conventional banks in Islamic countries (Panel B), 
Conventional banks in Other countries (Panel C). Whole period covers January 3, 2000, to December 31, 2013; Pre-crisis period 
covers January 3, 2000, to June 30, 2007; Crisis period covers July 1, 2007, to June 30, 2009; and Post-crisis period covers July 
1, 2009, to December 31, 2013. Q (10) denotes the average Ljung-Box test statistic for autocorrelation of the bank stock returns 
up to the 10th lag. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level respectively.
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Table 3. Summary statistics for the capital structure variables 
 Leverage MTB Profits Ln(Size) Collateral Dividend Ln(Risk)
Panel A: Islamic banks 
Mean 0.799 2.119 58.056 8.283 9105.034 0.348 -1.607 
Median 0.861 1.488 21.165 8.410 2023.092 0.000 -1.644 
Min 0.001 0.292 -606.953 0.828 0.045 0.000 -5.306 
Max 0.998 33.872 1983.233 11.556 124851.100 1.000 1.220 
SD 0.190 2.489 114.374 1.823 18255.410 0.476 0.957 
Skewness -2.358 5.726 4.861 -1.009 3.138 0.638 -0.081 
Kurtosis 8.112 50.281 58.074 5.034 13.118 1.407 3.144 
Observations 1841 1822 1849 1841 1837 1681 1760 
Panel B: Conventional banks in Islamic countries 
Mean 0.697 2.004 32.891 7.645 5801.102 0.184 -1.516 
Median 0.813 1.534 15.157 7.776 1168.513 0.000 -1.566 
Min 0.008 -1.418 -8233.113 3.701 0.045 0.000 -5.777 
Max 1.043 51.181 2316.242 11.940 166093.100 1.000 1.990 
SD 0.245 2.291 224.059 1.649 15729.830 0.387 0.958 
Skewness -1.064 10.994 -27.290 -0.066 6.124 1.633 0.176 
Kurtosis 2.948 188.655 998.288 2.411 48.618 3.666 3.300 
Observations 1906 1893 1907 1906 1922 3640 1711 
Panel C: Conventional bank in Other countries 
Mean 0.904 1.340 2.064 7.874 10256.890 0.282 -1.261 
Median 0.908 1.233 5.852 7.882 2390.336 0.000 -1.367 
Min 0.268 -0.042 -4560.398 3.655 0.305 0.000 -7.015 
Max 1.210 6.581 963.495 12.529 385325.700 1.000 2.851 
SD 0.057 0.699 313.581 1.594 29079.670 0.450 0.950 
Skewness -4.619 1.405 -13.413 0.156 7.774 0.967 0.139 
Kurtosis 58.654 7.908 195.641 2.414 76.846 1.934 4.977 
Observations 2047 2019 2069 2047 2055 3640 1912 
Notes: Summary statistics for the variables in the capital structure model. Dividend is a binary 
variable. Observations are on a firm-quarter basis. 
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Table 4. Univariate Value-at-Risk (VaR) results 
 IB CBI CBO pCBI pCBO IB CBI CBO pCBI pCBO 
Panel A: VaR Estimates 
 RiskMetrics (RM) Filtered Historical Simulation (FHS) 
Whole 0.034 0.033 0.039 0.511 0.289 0.041 0.042 0.049 0.624 0.265 
Pre-crisis 0.028 0.028 0.032 0.485 0.367 0.030 0.032 0.039 0.625 0.354 
Crisis 0.047 0.044 0.060 0.395 0.171 0.052 0.051 0.063 0.669 0.191 
Post-crisis 0.034 0.034 0.040 0.587 0.226 0.047 0.047 0.054 0.606 0.171 
Panel B: VaR Backtesting 
Whole period 
% Violations 6.10 4.31 3.09   5.56 3.79 1.86   
LRuc 1397 735 616   392 710 234   
LRind 392 266 217   408 318 56   
LRcc 1789 1001 833   800 1028 290   
Pre-crisis period 
% Violations 9.64 4.29 1.99   9.62 4.09 3.35   
LRuc 581 363 236   585 353 675   
LRind 92 88 61   88 117 174   
LRcc 673 451 297   673 470 849   
Crisis period 
% Violations 4.90 4.20 3.26   4.38 3.80 2.77   
LRuc 1629 896 645   1643 883 646   
LRind 320 236 172   331 272 198   
LRcc 1949 1132 817   1974 1155 844   
Post-crisis period 
% Violations 3.23 4.36 4.37   2.17 3.47 3.71   
LRuc 1744 913 979   1730 882 1053   
LRind 504 342 309   528 394 301   
LRcc 2248 1255 1288   2258 1276 1354   
Notes: VaR represents the average VaR for each portfolio at the 99% level over a one-day period. In Panel B, %Violations represents the actual number of violations of 
each portfolio. pCBI and pCBO  denote the p-value for the t-tests between the samples of Islamic banks and conventional banks in Islamic countries, and Islamic banks and 
conventional banks in Other countries. LRuc, LRind and LRcc are the test statistics, and the corresponding p-values are obtained from the ߯ଵଶ test. Whole period covers 
January 3, 2000, to December 31, 2013; Pre-crisis period covers January 3, 2000, to June 30, 2007; Crisis period covers July 1, 2007, to June 30, 2009; and Post-crisis 
period covers July 1, 2009, to December 31, 2013. Note all violation statistics are significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 5. Univariate Expected Shortfall (ES) results 
 IB CBI CBO pCBI pCBO IB CBI CBO pCBI pCBO 
Panel A: ES Estimates 
 RiskMetrics (RM) Filtered Historical Simulation (FHS) 
Whole 0.015 0.020 0.030 0.487 0.380 0.012 0.017 0.027 0.492 0.380 
Pre-crisis 0.006 0.013 0.033 0.485 0.410 0.006 0.011 0.031 0.497 0.424 
Crisis 0.032 0.034 0.056 0.469 0.356 0.030 0.033 0.052 0.446 0.381 
Post-crisis 0.030 0.022 0.022 0.497 0.348 0.029 0.019 0.017 0.501 0.321 
Panel B: Out of sample predictive performance (MAE) 
Whole period 
q = -0.6% 1.05 1.38 1.16   0.79 1.10 0.89   
q = -0.8% 1.04 1.38 1.17   0.82 1.13 0.90   
q = -1.0% 1.03 1.37 1.20   0.88 1.20 0.98   
q = -1.2% 1.05 1.38 1.25   0.94 1.28 1.06   
Pre-crisis period 
q = -0.6% 0.39 0.91 0.82   0.34 0.71 0.61   
q = -0.8% 0.38 0.87 0.80   0.33 0.68 0.60   
q = -1.0% 0.36 0.85 0.78   0.31 0.69 0.59   
q = -1.2% 0.37 0.85 0.78   0.31 0.70 0.59   
Crisis period 
q = -0.6% 2.45 2.60 2.12   2.26 2.34 2.04   
q = -0.8% 2.51 2.64 2.28   2.42 2.48 2.26   
q = -1.0% 2.52 2.66 2.45   2.56 2.57 2.47   
q = -1.2% 2.61 2.74 2.65   2.70 2.71 2.66   
Post-crisis period 
q = -0.6% 2.36 1.54 1.28   1.88 1.19 0.78   
q = -0.8% 2.29 1.55 1.27   1.93 1.24 0.88   
q = -1.0% 2.26 1.53 1.29   2.09 1.34 0.99   
q = -1.2% 2.23 1.53 1.31   2.19 1.46 1.12   
Notes: ES represents the average ES for each portfolio at the 99% level over a one-day period. Whole period covers January 3, 2000, to December 31, 2013; Pre-
crisis period covers January 3, 2000, to June 30, 2007; Crisis period covers July 1, 2007, to June 30, 2009; and Post-crisis period covers July 1, 2009, to December 
31, 2013.  Following Zhu and Galbraith (2011), we set threshold (loss) returns at q = -1.2%, -1%, -0.8%, -0.6% to ensure that there is a substantial number of points 
at which losses exceed q. 
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Table 6. Multivariate Value-at-Risk (VaR) and Expected Shortfall (ES) results 
 IB CBI CBO pCBI pCBO 
 Panel A: VaR 
Whole 0.0180 0.0192 0.0185 0.119 0.412 
Pre-crisis 0.0204 0.0200 0.0175 0.719 0.000 
Crisis 0.0145 0.0199 0.0197 0.010 0.002 
Post-crisis 0.0161 0.0178 0.0193 0.167 0.001 
 Panel B: ES 
Whole 0.0050 0.0766 0.0538 0.000 0.018 
Pre-crisis 0.0076 0.1450 0.0570 0.000 0.009 
Crisis 0.0411 0.0971 0.0624 0.010 0.009 
Post-crisis 0.0215 0.0744 0.0302 0.011 0.078 
Notes: VaR represents the average VaR for each portfolio at the 99% level over a one-day period. ES represents the ES 
for each portfolio at the 99% level over a one-day period. Whole period covers January 3, 2000, to December 31, 2013; 
Pre-crisis period covers January 3, 2000, to June 30, 2007; Crisis period covers July 1, 2007, to June 30, 2009; and Post-
crisis period covers July 1, 2009, to December 31, 2013. pCBI and pCBO  denote the p-value for the t-tests between the 
samples of Islamic banks and conventional banks in Islamic countries, and Islamic banks and conventional banks in Other 
countries.  
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Table 7: Capital structure estimation results 
 Whole Period ߂ሺܫܤ െ ܥܤሻ Pre-crisis ߂ሺܫܤ െ ܥܤሻ Crisis ߂ሺܫܤ െ ܥܤሻ Post-crisis ߂ሺܫܤ െ ܥܤሻ 
MTB  -0.0007  -0.0012  -0.0039*  -0.0037  
 (0.0024)  (0.0017)  (0.0024)  (0.0039)  
Profits -0.0024*  -0.0193**  -0.0009***  -0.0037***  
 (0.0014)  (0.0097)  (0.0002)  (0.0010)  
Ln(Size) 0.0254**  0.0038  0.0143  0.0419***  
 (0.0120)  (0.0143)  (0.0175)  (0.0142)  
Collateral -0.2381*  0.4747  -0.3475  -0.2436*  
 (0.1302)  (0.3928)  (0.2936)  (0.1342)  
Dividends -0.0030  -0.0004  -0.0028  0.0022  
 (0.0033)  (0.0041)  (0.0027)  (0.0017)  
Ln(Risk) 0.0014  0.0055  -0.0004  0.0034  
 (0.0032)  (0.0045)  (0.0020)  (0.0027)  
MTB x IB -0.0505** 5.4300** -0.0535** 3.9000** 0.0012 0.1700 -0.0847*** 8.4800*** 
 (0.0209)  (0.0263)  (0.0115)  (0.0270)  
Profits x IB -92.2187** 4.5000** -210.3698*** 27.4400*** -144.7886 0.8500 -35.8511*** 6.9900*** 
 (43.4538)  (40.1565)  (157.3518)  (13.5564)  
Ln(Size) x IB 0.0181 0.0900 0.0342 0.6300 0.0629** 1.3700 0.0832** 0.8700 
 (0.0138)  (0.0292)  (0.0284)  (0.0366)  
Collateral x IB -1.0264*** 3.5700** -2.2357*** 10.9000*** -4.3439* 2.5100 -1.2937*** 12.8400*** 
 (0.3512)  (0.4591)  (2.4731)  (0.1786)  
Dividends x IB 0.3120 2.3000 0.5543*** 75.0500*** 0.4516*** 71.6400*** 0.2686* 3.4300* 
 (0.2077)  (0.0636)  (0.0535)  (0.1439)  
Ln(Risk) x IB -0.0163 2.0300 -0.0190 2.8600* -0.2008* 2.9200* -0.0491*** 16.0400*** 
 (0.0110)  (0.0123)  (0.1172)  (0.0122)  
IB -0.4661***  -0.8226***  -1.6349***  -1.3646***  
 (0.1523)  (0.2458)  (0.5372)  (0.3543)  
Constant 0.5956***  0.8011***  0.6819***  0.4648***  
 (0.0978)  (0.1055)  (0.1437)  (0.1199)  
Observations 3488  1115  679  1694  
Adjusted R2 15.08%  19.86%  9.56%  17.68%  
Notes: The table presents estimated coefficients and robust standard errors in parenthesis for equation (15). IB denotes the Islamic banking dummy that takes 1 for Islamic Financial 
Institutions, zero otherwise. MTB denotes the Market-to-Book ratio. The ߂ሺܫܤ െ ܥܤሻ column reports the chi-square (߯ଶ ) test statistic for the difference in the coefficients of the 
conventional and the Islamic banks. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level respectively. 
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